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Introduction
By their own estimates, state governments have accrued more than three-quarters of a trillion dollars 
in pension debt. When combined with municipal pension debt, conservative estimates of the total 
state and local unfunded liability top $1 trillion. While the global financial crisis and the recession that 
followed are partially to blame for this huge run-up in debt, structural problems with the traditional 
defined benefit system and irresponsible policy decisions are also culprits. Annual pension payments 
were on the rise well before financial markets took a turn for the worse in the fall of 2008. In fact, 
pension costs have been increasing almost universally since the tech bubble burst in the early 2000s 
signaling the end of the historic run-up of equity prices that occurred through the 1990s.
Given that pension systems rely on investment returns to fund the majority of promised worker 
benefits, pension costs rise when the economy underperforms. Thus, recent pension cost increases have 
coincided with sharp declines in tax revenues that followed the financial crisis. This has put immense 
stress not only on state and local budgets, but also on employee wages and benefits.
In the wake of rising pension costs and stagnant or declining budgets, many policymakers have 
questioned the sustainability of the current system. The accumulated pension debt will take decades to 
pay off (most states spread debt payments across 30 or more years), increasing cost in the medium- to 
long-term and leaving plans and worker benefits vulnerable to another downturn. 
In light of this challenging fiscal situation, many jurisdictions have looked to reform their retirement 
savings systems. The majority have maintained the traditional defined benefit structure, cutting benefits 
primarily for new workers, but in some cases for current employees and retirees as well. While these 
efforts reduce the cost of benefits, they do not address the root of the problem because they maintain 
the core structure that allowed the pension debt to grow so precipitously in the first place. Other more 
ambitions jurisdictions have sought to engage in comprehensive reform that will not just cut cost, but 
will also definitively fix the system, protecting workers and taxpayers alike.
As policymakers have considered reforms, many concerns have been raised about transitions to different 
retirement savings systems. Opponents of reform have sought to derail these efforts by, among other 
things, claiming that any transition from the status quo would result in significant, unforeseen costs. 
This paper will briefly describe the major “transition cost” arguments and will explain why those 
arguments do not survive careful analysis.
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Pension Cost Explained
Before discussing specific transition cost arguments, it is important to establish a more general 
understanding of pension cost. A public employer’s annual pension payment is comprised of two parts: 
(1) normal cost and (2) debt service.1 These two parts are wholly separable and should be handled as 
distinct budgetary line items. Mishandling either portion can lead to additional pension debt and, in 
turn, growing benefit cost.
Public pension systems are meant to be pre-funded, that is employee and employer contributions made 
during a worker’s career should fully cover the cost of promised benefits. Normal cost is the cost of the 
retirement benefits workers earn each year or the annual contribution necessary to pre-fund employee 
benefits as they are earned.
Since traditional defined benefit systems promise an annuity that changes dramatically in value during 
an employee’s career and given that the value also varies based on an employee’s entry age and salary, 
cost is not calculated directly at the individual level. Rather, normal cost is estimated across the entire 
member population. The most common method for estimating normal cost is called Entry Age 
Normal. This method uses predictions about the future path of many unknown variables, including 
economic conditions, the probability workers remain in public employment, wage growth, and life 
expectancy, among others, to calculate a constant percentage of employee pay that, if contributed on 
an annual basis, would fully fund promised benefits.
When a pension plan’s assumptions about the future do not match real world experience, normal 
cost contributions can be insufficient to cover the cost of benefits workers have already earned. The 
result is an unfunded liability or pension debt. Paying down any pension debt that accrues is the sole 
responsibility of the plan sponsor. Future employee contributions are not used to pay down this debt, 
and employees are always entitled to withdraw their contributions, usually with accumulated interest.
Pension debt should be thought of and managed just like any other government debt. When a 
government accrues a debt, it has accepted goods or services and used credit to fund that consumption. 
This is exactly what happens when a jurisdiction accrues an unfunded liability. Public workers provided 
labor for which they were promised a certain level of compensation, but instead of fully paying the 
promised compensation using current revenue, government, in effect, took out debt from the pension 
system to fund its consumption.
Pension debt is generally amortized, or paid off, through annual payments over many (usually 30 
or more) years. Two methods have traditionally been used to determine the repayment schedule for 
pension debt: (1) level dollar and (2) level percent of pay.
Level dollar amortization works like a fixed 30-year mortgage. Debt is paid through a series of 
constant or level annual payments. Level percent of pay, on the other hand, allows debt payments to 
be backloaded, rising over time as payroll increases. Under level percent of pay, debt service payments 
are a constant percentage of payroll and as payroll increases, so do the debt service payments.
The reasoning behind an increasing payment schedule, like level percent of pay, is that it maintains 
relatively constant labor cost across time. However, in practice, it allows employers to keep current cost 
1 In pension terminology, debt service is called the amortization payment, but since it is useful to think of the unfunded liability as a 
debt that is owed to public workers, it is helpful to employ a debt-related term here as well.
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low by pushing a large portion of the debt into the future. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between 
level dollar and level percent of pay amortization.2  Although the values for a particular jurisdiction 
may vary, the shape of these curves will not.
 
FiGUre 1: Debt Service Schedules (Nominal Dollars)
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The level percent of pay schedule results in lower annual payments in early years, but much higher 
payments for the majority of the payment schedule. Because level dollar amortization has higher 
payments early on, the total amount required to pay off the debt is lower. In this example, a level dollar 
schedule results in 42 percent of total inflation adjusted debt service payments being made within 10 
years, while a level percent of pay schedule only results in 29 percent being paid during that time. 
The result of pushing more of the debt into the future is quite costly. Under level percent of pay, the 
required payments at the end of the schedule will be more than twice as large as under level dollar, and 
the total amount necessary to pay off the debt will be 16 percent larger.
Figure 2 illustrates debt payoff under these differing payment schedules. The most striking feature 
of this graph is that the level percent of pay line is always above the level dollar line signifying that 
the debt is paid off more quickly under level dollar. Notably, the debt actually increases for the first 
2 The amortization example uses an initial pension debt of $100 amortized over a closed 30-year interval, annual payroll growth of 4 
percent, an assumed investment rate of return of 8 percent, and inflation of 2.5 percent.
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12 years of the payment schedule under level percent of pay and does not come back down below 
its original value until year 21. Given the size of current pension debts, using a level percent of pay 
schedule increases the total cost of worker benefits by billions of dollars.
FiGUre 2: Pension Debt Payoff
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Policy Arguments
In the face of rising pension cost and a system that allows public employers to underfund worker 
benefits, many jurisdictions have looked to reform their retirement systems. A few have considered 
a structural change, moving away from the traditional defined benefit system and toward more 
sustainable alternatives. In the discussion about structural pension reform, several concerns have been 
raised regarding how reform would affect the current system and overall cost. The remainder of this 
policy brief will address the two primary arguments leveled against a transition to a new system.
Argument I: Moving to a new system would starve the current system of needed 
contributions.
Moving to a new system would have little to no effect on the current system. State and local pensions 
are pre-funded systems, and unlike Social Security, the contributions of workers today do not subsidize 
today’s retirees. Future normal cost contributions are used to fund new benefit accruals that workers 
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earn on a go-forward basis and are not used to close funding gaps. Therefore, it matters little whether 
the normal cost payments are used to fund new benefits under the current system or a new system.
If new workers are placed in a new system that has an annual cost equal to, or less than, the current plan’s 
normal cost, and the new plan has less funding risk, then the new system will cost less than the current 
system. The new system could provide new workers with more certainty that their benefits would 
be fully funded. It could also reduce the risk of a future funding crisis, providing added retirement 
security to those workers who have already earned benefits under the current system.
Paying the pension debt is the sole responsibility of the public employers who participate in the plan, 
and as previously discussed, they make debt service payments, in addition to the normal cost, to pay 
down that debt over time. Moving new workers to a new system does not affect the funded level of 
past benefit accruals, nor does it affect the debt service payments employers must make to pay off any 
accrued debt. The pension debt is a bill that is owed to public workers for past service, and this debt 
must be paid regardless of the go-forward retirement savings system.
In situations where a plan is severely underfunded, the plan may face a cash flow problem. This is 
particularly true when plan sponsors have consistently avoided making prudent debt service payments 
by either intentionally underfunding the annual pension payment or irresponsibly pushing too much 
of the debt into the future by back-loading the funding schedule. However, few plans are currently 
in such bad shape. Moreover, the fix in these situations is not to continue on the same path until 
worker benefits are in jeopardy and taxpayers face a huge run-up in contributions. The solution is to 
comprehensively reform the system, to secure past accruals, and to create a system going forward that 
is affordable, sustainable, and secure.
Argument II: There are large costs associated with a transition.
Some claim that even though a new system might be desirable, it is impossible to get from here to 
there because of large costs associated with a transition. These claims are wrong both in theory and in 
practice. Below are the two primary “transition cost” claims that have been advanced.
GASB requires a shift in amortization method for closed plans
University of Arkansas Professor Robert Costrell thoroughly debunks this myth in a paper titled “GASB 
Won’t Let me”- A False Objection to Public Pension Reform.3 This claim is based on the accounting rules 
set forth by the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB). The old rules (GASB 25 & 27) 
called for an accounting switch from level percent of pay amortization to level-dollar when debt service 
payments could no longer be spread over a growing payroll. Actuaries have shortsightedly labeled the 
switch in amortization schedules a cost because it would lead to higher payments in the short-run as 
illustrated in Figure 1. However, moving to level dollar would also pay off the pension debt faster and 
significantly lower overall cost. In the end, if governments were to make this switch, it would save 
money.
In addition, this old GASB rule only applies to situations where the debt service for a defined benefit 
plan can no longer be spread over a growing payroll. As such, it does not apply to situations where the 
plan sponsor moves new employees to a hybrid or cash balance system, but only to a scenario where 
3 This paper is available electronically on the Laura and John Arnold Foundation website. Click here to open the document.
8Laura and John Arnold Foundation  •  www.arnoldfoundation.org  •  2800 Post Oak Blvd.  •  Suite 225  •  Houston, TX  77056  •  713.554.1349
the old defined benefit system is closed and new employees are placed in a defined contribution. Even 
then, debt service payments can easily be spread over total payroll, rather than just defined benefit 
membership as Alaska did when it switched to a defined contribution plan in 2005. Alaska remains on 
a level percent of pay amortization schedule despite closing its defined benefit plan to new entrants. 
Alaska has been rewarded for the action it took to reform its pension systems. Ratings agencies have 
upgraded the state’s credit rating twice since 2005 both times citing pension reform as one of the 
reasons.
Importantly, the language regarding amortization schedules has been removed from GASB’s recently 
approved update (GASB 67 & 68). The new standards go into effect in fiscal year 2014 and make this 
claim entirely moot going forward. In describing the revision, GASB made it clear that it sets standards 
for accounting and has never had any authority to dictate funding policy.4 Now, as it has always been, 
it is up to state and local governments to adhere to a prudent payment schedule on pension debt. 
Winding-down requires more conservative and liquid investments over time
When a defined benefit pension system is closed to new members, it will eventually pay all of the 
benefits owed to workers and cease to exist. Some have claimed this wind-down requires the fund to 
invest more conservatively and in more liquid investments as the fund gets closer to closure. The first 
of these claims is simply wrong, and the second is trivial. 
The claim that a closed fund must shift to more conservative investments is based on a misunderstanding 
of portfolio theory. The level of risk a government is willing to take with its pension investments should 
be independent of whether the plan is open or closed.5  A government should be willing to accept the 
same level of pension investment risk regardless of whether plan assets are growing or shrinking. The 
myth of time diversification was debunked many years ago by Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson.6
Regarding investment liquidity, a closed plan will need to move to more liquid investments at the very 
end of its existence to make benefit payments, but this change in asset allocation does not need to 
happen until the last few years of a plan’s existence when the remaining asset base is small. Given the 
small size of the affected asset base and the fact that only a relatively small portion of pension assets 
are in illiquid investments to begin with, the effect of a shift to more liquid investments will have a 
trivial effect on overall plan cost. The cost of transitioning to more liquid investments is not only trivial 
relative to overall plan cost, but is also orders of magnitude smaller than the potential downside risk of 
the current system, a fact that is surprisingly absent from these discussions.
4 A plain language description of the recent GASB changes can be found on its website. Click here to open the document.
5 For a concise and relatively non-technical explanation of time diversification see “The Portable Financial Analyst: What Practitioners 
Need to Know” by Mark Kritzman.
6 Paul Samuelson originally debunked the myth in a 1966 paper. Since then, Zvi Bodie and others have also debunked the myth. See 
Samuelson, P. (1966). Risk and Uncertainty: A Fallacy of Large Numbers. In J. Stiglitz (Ed.), The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul 
A. Samuelson. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, and Bodie, Z. (1995). On the Risk of Stocks in the Long Run. Financial Analyst Journal, 
51(3), 18-22.
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Conclusion
Public pension reform is arguably one of the most immediate and intractable financial problems facing 
all levels of government today. The underfunding of worker retirement benefits is irresponsible. Rising 
pension cost has placed undue political and budgetary pressure on workers’ benefits, salaries, and even 
their jobs. Unfortunately, the next generation of public workers and taxpayers will be left to deal with 
this hefty fiscal burden unless we take action to fix the system.
Too often misguided claims of potential increased cost frustrate reform efforts that would otherwise 
place systems on a more sustainable path, protecting both workers and taxpayers. Policymakers should 
move beyond these distracting and misleading claims and fix the broken system once and for all.
